Reserve Board, we investigate whether federally regulated bank holding companies (BHCs) increased dividend distributions after JGTRRA. By focusing on BHCs, we are able to compare the responses to this important but temporary change in tax policy across publicly-traded and privately-held corporations, while controlling for industry-related factors. Examining private firms' dividend payouts and reactions to JGTRRA allows us to estimate the effect of differential taxation on dividend policy in a setting that is relatively free of the information asymmetry and agency problems that may dominate the payout decisions of public firms. We find that dividend yield (i.e. dividend distributions deflated by assets) increased after the reduction of the dividend tax rate for both private and public BHCs. However, private BHCs increased dividend payouts to a greater extent than public BHCs. Our comparison of public and private payouts also corroborates evidence that public firms pay dividends to mitigate agency conflicts and this effect may act to dampen the public-firm response to the dividend tax reduction in JGTRRA.
Does Ownership Structure Affect Corporations' Responses to Lower Dividend Tax Rates? An Analysis of Public and Private Banks I. INTRODUCTION
The relation between dividend policy and taxation has puzzled financial economists for decades (Stiglitz 1973; Black 1976) . For much of the history of income taxation in the U.S., individuals have faced higher tax rates on dividend income than on long-term capital gains.
Hence, a policy of making dividend distributions to individual shareholders is sub-optimal compared to a policy of repurchasing shares or reinvesting profits. Yet, despite the tax disadvantages of paying dividends, many firms make regular dividend distributions in the apparent belief that retail investors prefer dividend paying stocks (Brav et al. 2004 ). We investigate the relation between dividend policy and taxation by comparing changes in dividend payouts for a sample of public (publicly-traded) firms to those for a sample of private (privatelyheld) corporations around the 2003 reduction in dividend taxes. A comparison of the dividend response for private versus public firms around a reduction in dividend taxes provides a unique opportunity to test the extent to which (1) individual taxation discourages corporations from paying dividends and (2) dividend policy is influenced by nontax considerations.
A battered stock market set the stage for proposals to reduce dividend taxation, beginning with President George W. Bush's economic summit in August 2002 (Esenwein and Gravelle 2003) .
In late May 2003, Congress passed and President Bush signed the Jobs and Growth Tax
Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003 (JGTRRA), which significantly lowered the maximum individual tax rate on dividend income (from 38.1 percent) and equalized it with the maximum tax rate on capital gains at 15 percent. 1 Among the rationales offered by legislators and the Bush administration in support of dividend tax relief were that it would (1) increase the value of the stock market (Davis 2003) , (2) mitigate corporate governance problems (Bush 2003) 2 , and (3) lead to "economic growth and the creation of jobs" by reducing the cost of capital for corporations (H.R. ¶10, 110) . The first two of these objectives and much of the political rhetoric about lowering the dividend tax rate pertain exclusively to publicly-traded firms. 3 Several concurrent studies investigate the effect of JGTRRA's dividend tax rate cut on dividend initiations and payouts by publicly-traded firms. Using a sample of non-utility, nonfinancial firms traded on the three major stock exchanges, Chetty and Saez (2004) find that the probabilities of dividend initiations and dividend increases during the first four quarters following the tax cut (through 2004 Q2) are greater for firms with low-growth forecasts and for firms whose major shareholders and/or managers also had incentives to increase dividends.
Using a sample of publicly-traded firms that declared dividends during the first six months following passage of JGTRRA, Blouin, Ready and Shackelford (2004) find that quarterly dividends per share increased after the tax rate cut. Although they do not find a significant relation between responses to the tax cut and the extent to which shares are owned by individual investors, they do find some evidence that dividend increases were greater for firms with high levels of insider ownership (i.e. shares owned by officers and directors). Similarly, Brown, Liang and Weisbenner (2005) find that the probability of a dividend increase by publicly-traded firms following enactment of JGTRRA is increasing in direct stock ownership by firms' top five executives, and decreasing in the number of stock options held by these individuals. 4 Collectively, these studies suggest that public firms' responses to the dividend tax cut depend on the extent to which their top managers' economic interests are aligned with those of shareholders. On the other hand, Julio and Ikenberry (2004) suggest that the upward trend in dividend payouts by public firms began at least two years before the tax cut and may have been driven by changing economic conditions and a desire to restore investor confidence in the aftermath of corporate accounting scandals. 5 We contribute to this literature by comparing the pre-and post-JGTRRA dividend payouts of publicly-traded versus privately-held bank holding companies (BHCs). To facilitate this comparison, we use data from call reports filed with the Federal Reserve Board to construct a panel of 29 consecutive quarterly observations, from 1998 Q1 to 2005 Q1, for 323 public and 216 private BHCs organized as taxable C corporations. 6 Most prior studies of dividend policy exclude BHCs because, unlike other industries, bank holding companies are monitored by bank regulators and must meet minimum capital requirements that may constrain dividend payouts. In contrast to other studies that combine firms across unregulated industries, our research design holds industry effects constant by focusing exclusively on BHCs. It is important to understand the effect of shareholder taxes on BHCs' payouts because this industry sector accounts for a substantial portion of total dividends paid by public firms. For example, in 2002, the year prior to JGTRRA, the public bank sector (2-digit SIC = 60) paid a total of $61 billion in dividends, more than any other 2-digit SIC group. Moreover, the bank sector represents 12. Finally, any differential effect of JGTRRA across these two groups is not attributable to changing economic conditions, which are held constant across groups. Nor is a greater response to JGTRRA by private firms attributable to market-driven increases in investors' preferences for dividends because such market preferences should be largely irrelevant to private firms. Market preferences are not, however, irrelevant to the public firms in our sample. Allen and Michaely (2003) and others conjecture that dividends are paid by public firms to mitigate agency conflicts between managers and shareholders. DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Stulz (2004) conjecture that agency conflicts become more severe as profits accumulate, and they present evidence that distributions increase in the ratio of retained earnings to total assets. We test their conjecture directly by comparing whether distributions by both public and private firms are positively associated with retained earnings.
Our initial analysis reveals that the magnitude and frequency of dividends over our sample period is seasonal across calendar quarters and generally increasing across years for both public and private firms. To control for these trends as well as financial and regulatory considerations, we estimate random effects regressions of annual dividend yield on tax regime (an indicator variable identifying periods after the structural shift in tax rates enacted in JGTRRA) and firm-level financial characteristics (e.g., profitability, liquidity, capital adequacy, and maturity). 8 Our regression results indicate that both private and public BHCs significantly increased dividend distributions after the enactment of JGTRRA. We estimate that the average private BHC in our sample increased dividends by 0.096% of total assets during the first four quarters following enactment (i.e. 2003 Q3 through 2004 Q2) , while the average public BHC in our sample increased dividends by only 0.026% of total assets. Although both increases represent a significant tax-induced departure from their pre-JGTRRA payout policies, the average response by private BHCs was significantly greater than the average response by public BHCs.
In addition, our regression results indicate that distributions from private BHCs are unrelated to the level of retained earnings. In contrast, we find that distributions from public BHCs are positively related to the level of retained earnings. This finding supports the results reported by DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Stulz (2004) and suggests that distributions related to agency conflicts may be one explanation for the muted response by public firms to the dividend tax reduction in
JGTRRA.
The remainder of this study is organized as follows. The next section summarizes the related literature and develops the hypotheses. The third section presents the research method including a description of the sample. The fourth and fifth sections report our results and supplemental analyses, respectively. The final section concludes.
II. PRIOR LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT
A substantial body of prior research seeks to identify factors that explain cross-sectional differences in firms' dividend policies. Allen and Michaely (2003) Treasurer, and are approved by the CEO before being considered by the Board of Directors.
Hence, it is not surprising that managers' personal outcomes affect payout decisions.
We conjecture that, ceteris paribus, dividend taxes operate analogous to transaction costs, thereby reducing the number and magnitude of distributions during periods of high dividend tax rates. If our expectations hold, we anticipate that the likelihood and amount of dividend distributions for public and private BHCs will increase after the tax rate reduction enacted in JGTRRA. We expect that nontax factors (e.g., reductions in liquidity, profitability, or capital) may preclude dividend distributions for certain BHCs. Hence, we employ a multivariate regression to control for these nontax considerations.
In addition, we expect that the dividend tax effect will be greater for private BHCs than for BHCs whose stock is publicly-traded on stock exchanges. First, information asymmetry between managers and stockholders and agency problems are likely to be smaller for private
BHCs than for public BHCs due to the high concentration of private BHC ownership among opportunities to pay "deductible dividends". If neither constraint is binding, then private firms would probably not increase dividend payouts in response to the dividend rate cut.
relatively few shareholders (Beatty and Harris 1999; Niswander and Swanson 2000; Brav, Graham, Harvey and Michaely 2004) . 12 Our public versus private comparison is analogous to the comparison of public firms across countries with differing levels of legal protection for minority shareholders. La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (2000) find that dividend policy is related to cross-country differences in shareholder protection. Firms organized in countries with poor shareholder protection distribute less, presumably because there is little information asymmetry between controlling shareholders and management. 13 Such firms are analogous to the private BHCs in our sample. In contrast, firms organized in countries with good shareholder protection tend to distribute more as dividends, consistent with shareholders using their legal rights to limit professional managers.
Second, as described above, shareholders of private BHCs are very likely to be individuals who are directly affected by the decrease in the dividend tax rate and directly involved in managing the BHC. 14 Because managers of private BHCs are likely to be 12 To provide support for this assumption, we examined the most recently filed Annual Report of Bank Holding Companies (FR Y-6) for a sub-sample of 30 private BHCs. Among other items, this report lists "each shareholder of record that directly or indirectly owns, controls, or holds with power to vote 5 percent or more of any class of voting securities" of the BHC. Nineteen of the 30 BHCs in this sub-sample reported ownership information for at least 80 percent of their shareholdings, while the other eleven provided ownership information for, on average, 42 percent of their shareholdings. Of the 19 (11) BHCs providing information for at least (less than) 80 percent of the shareholdings, 95 (93) percent of the reported shares are owned by individuals. Moreover, the average number of shareholders owning at least a 5 percent interest is 4.6 (3.6) for the BHCs providing information for at least (less than) 80 percent of the shareholdings, respectively. These data suggest that private BHCs have highly concentrated individual ownership.
shareholders, we expect their dividend payout decisions to be much more aligned with shareholders' personal tax incentives (Ke 2001) . This rationale is supported by prior research on the relation between insider ownership and dividend policy of non-financial, publicly-traded firms. Jensen et al. (1992) show that dividend payouts are negatively related to insider ownership of public firms, which may be explained by lower agency costs or greater attention to individual tax considerations when dividends are tax disadvantaged. Blouin et al. (2004) find that public firms' responsiveness to JGTRRA is increasing in the level of insider ownership, which again suggests greater attention to personal tax incentives. It is important to note, however, that regardless of the level of insider ownership, a publicly-traded firm's share price is determined in public markets. Therefore, status as a private firm represents more than just an extreme case of insider ownership.
III. RESEARCH METHOD
We investigate the dividend tax effect by first examining the trend of quarterly BHC dividend distributions from 1998 Q1 through 2005 Q1 for sample firms classified by ownership structure (private and public BHCs). We then develop a regression model to test the association between dividend yield and the structural shift in dividend tax rates enacted in JGTRRA while controlling for financial and regulatory considerations as well as time and firm invariant effects.
Sample Selection
We construct our sample by identifying all BHCs filing call reports with the Federal
Reserve Board in 2003 Q3. We limit sample BHCs to firms that were not subsidiaries or Subchapter S electing corporations. We further restrict our sample to those BHCs that filed call of their built-in gains on investment securities and lower for banks that would suffer a decline in their regulatory capital category if their deferred tax assets were written off. Exchange firms are those trading on the NYSE, AMEX or NASDAQ, whereas Other Public firms include any firm for which SNL can obtain a CUSIP. We include firms as public if we can identify both a ticker symbol and a CUSIP number. Private firms are those without CUSIP numbers or ticker symbols. 16 As we add new quarters of data to the sample, we lose firms from the panel that lack data for those quarters. For example, 13 private (one public) firms were dropped due to missing data in 2004 Q3. 17 Tests were conducted using both parametric (t tests) and nonparametric (Wilcoxon tests) statistics (p < 0.05, twotailed). 18 The liquidity ratio is liquid assets divided by total liabilities at the end of the period. Liquid assets are defined as the sum of cash and balances due, securities, federal funds sold, and trading account assets less pledged securities. 19 The tier 1 risk ratio is the core capital (tier 1 capital) divided by risk-weighted assets. Core capital is total equity less net unrealized gains and unrealized losses less accumulated net gains (losses) on cash flow hedges less nonqualifying perpetual preferred stock and qualifying minority interests in consolidated subsidiaries less disallowed goodwill and other intangible assets and other miscellaneous adjustments. Risk-weighted assets are defined per the regulatory capital requirements, which classifies assets into four risk categories (e.g., category 1 includes cash and equivalents; category 4 includes commercial and consumer loans) and assigns a risk weight to each category (e.g., category 1 assets are assigned a weight of zero; category 4 assets are 100 percent risk-weighted).
In general, the tier 1 capital should equal or exceed 4 percent of risk-weighted assets.
relative distributions (dividend yield) as the amount of dividends deflated by various measures of size including total assets (DIV/TA), income (DIV/INC), and tier 1 capital (DIV/T1C). When averaged across the seven full calendar years in our sample, public BHCs pay higher dividends and have a higher dividend yield (regardless of yield measure) than private BHCs. Table 1 here Figure 1 depicts the percentage of firms in each ownership group that make dividend distributions for each quarter in our sample period. Over 90% (50%) of public (private) BHCs pay a dividend in any given quarter, and this rate is considerably higher than the 20% rate for publicly-traded industrial firms reported by Chetty and Saez (2004) . Close inspection of Figure 1 reveals no discernible increase in the percentage of public BHCs paying dividends post-JGTRRA, but this could be attributable to a ceiling effect caused by the already high distribution rate. In fact, only 25 (five) private (public) BHCs paid no dividends during our sample period. There is also a strong upward trend in both the median and mean dollar amount of distributions for public firms throughout the sample period. Although there appears to be a marked increase in distributions in 2003 Q4, particularly for private BHCs, the overall trend makes it difficult to assess how much of this increase is due to the dividend tax cut. Additionally, growth in firm assets over time, particularly for public firms, might explain the upward trend in distributions. To assess the trend in distributions relative to size, Figure 3 presents the quarterly dividend yields (DIV/TA) over the same time period. Deflating distributions by assets controls for growth over time, but the pattern of seasonality remains and is especially pronounced for the private BHCs. Figures 1, 2, and 3 here ------------------------- Table 2 - Tables 2 and 3 here than private BHCs in the low dividend quartile. Public BHCs in the high dividend quartile are more profitable, more liquid, and better capitalized than the public BHCs in the low quartile. In contrast, public BHCs in the low yield quartile tend to have higher growth rates (Growth) than the firms in the high yield quartile. These differences between high and low dividend quartiles suggest the importance of controlling for firm characteristics in our later tests.
Tests of the Effect of JGTRRA on Dividend Distributions
We test for the effect of the dividend tax reduction after the enactment of JGTRRA by estimating regressions of dividend yield (DIV/TA) on a tax rate cut indicator variable (DRATE)
for each ownership group. We employ multiple control variables that represent firm-specific factors previously found to be associated with BHC distributions. Because dividends vary across our panel of firms over time, we control for time and firm effects by estimating the random effects regression in equation (1). 20 To allow for the possibility that estimated coefficients on the various explanatory variables might differ by ownership structure, we estimate equation (1) separately for private and public BHCs. (2004), we include the ratio of retained earnings to total assets, RE/TA, to control for public firms' incentive to pay dividends to mitigate agency problems that might become more severe as profits accumulate. Table 4 presents the results of estimating equation (1) on an annual basis for private (public) BHCs. In column (1), the regression is estimated using annual periods composed of hypothetical fiscal years ending in Q2 whereas column (2) presents the regression results composed of calendar years. The estimated coefficient for DRATE is significantly positive across both the regressions for both private and public BHCs. Using a test of equality of coefficients across regressions, we find that the DRATE coefficients for private BHCs are significantly greater than those of the public BHCs for both the Q2 regression and the calendar 22 Subsequent studies reevaluated the Lintner (1956) model and find the positive relation between profitability and dividends to be robust (Fama and Babiak 1968; Bernartzi, Michaely, and Thaler 1997; Brav, Graham, Harvey and Michaely 2004) . 23 In annual regressions, ROA is measured by summing income for four consecutive quarters within period t and dividing by total assets at the end of period t. In quarterly regressions, ROA is income for that quarter divided by total assets at the end of the same quarter.
IV. REGRESSION RESULTS

Panel A (Panel B) of
year regression (χ 2 = 3.85; p = 0.03, and χ 2 = 6.48; p = 0.01, respectively). 24 This is consistent with our expectation that private BHCs respond more readily to their shareholders' personal tax incentives than do public BHCs. These estimates suggest that from a policy perspective the dividend tax cut was more likely to benefit shareholders of private BHCs than publicly-traded
BHCs.
-
------------------------Insert Table 4 here -------------------------
The control variables included in the regressions are largely consistent with expectations.
Profitability (ROA) exerts a powerful positive influence on distributions for all ownership structures; whereas, liquidity (LIQ) is not statistically significant in a consistent manner for either private or public BHCs. In contrast, Growth is significantly negative for both public and private firms, which is consistent with growing firms re-investing free cash flow rather than paying dividends. Finally, our results are consistent with the maturity/agency conjecture of DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Stulz (2004) that higher retained earnings (RE/TA) is positively associated with dividend yield for public BHCs, suggesting that public firms pay dividend to limit overinvestment by managers. Importantly, RE/TA is not statistically significant for private BHCs, consistent with the lack of agency concerns where ownership is highly concentrated and closely connected to management. Table 5 presents the results of estimating equation (1) on a quarter-by-quarter basis as an alternative means of controlling for quarterly seasonality. In the Q3 and Q4 models, each firm has five pre-JGTRRA observations and two post-JGTRRA observations. In the Q1 (Q2) model, 24 We use the suest command in STATA to assess the equality of DRATE coefficients across public and private OLS regressions. This method allows testing across equations when error variances are not the same across equations by combining multiple estimation results into simultaneous results with a single stacked parameter vector and a robust variance-covariance matrix (see Clogg et al 1995 for details). each firm has six pre-JGTRRA observations and two (one) post-JGTRRA observations. A significantly positive coefficient on DRATE for a particular quarter indicates that dividend yields were higher for quarters after JGTRRA relative to the same quarters in pre-JGTRRA years.
Columns (1) through (4) of Table 5 contain the results from estimating quarterly random effects regressions for quarters 3, 4, 1, and 2, respectively, corresponding to the four successive quarters since the enactment of JGTRRA.
-------------------------
Insert Table 5 here 
V. SUPPLEMENTAL ANALYSIS
We assessed the sensitivity of our regression estimates for equation (1) in several ways.
First, to mitigate the effect of extremely large banks and money center banks, we verified that our regression results are robust to the elimination of 45 firms with assets in excess of $10.65 billion at the end of 2003 Q3. Second, we analyzed the effect influential observations by re-estimating the annual regressions after excluding potentially influential observations identified using the procedures in Belsley, Kuh, and Welsch (1980) . Exclusion of these observations produces results that are not qualitatively different than those presented in Table 4 . Third, we reestimated the annual regressions using DIV/INC and DIV/T1C as the dependent variable in lieu of using DIV/TA. Again, the estimated tax effects were not qualitatively different than those presented in Table 4 . Finally, we also re-estimated equation (1) using alternative fiscal years composed of four consecutive quarters ending on Q1 and Q3. The results using these two alternative samples are also consistent with those presented in Table 4 .
In all of the preceding analyses, we control for quarterly seasonality by either pooling quarters within years (i.e., annualizing) or estimating the model on a quarter-by-quarter basis. As an alternative, we also estimate equation (1) using all quarterly observations in a model that includes both annual and quarter fixed effects, as well as firm between-effects and a correction for autocorrelation. This model is potentially more powerful because it uses all available information, including observations for 6,264 (9,367) firm-quarters for private (public) BHCs.
Untabulated results indicate that these regressions are statistically significant (χ 2 tests p < .001) but have less explanatory power than the annual regressions reported in Table 4 (R 2 is 2.7 for private and 8.1 for public BHCs). Nevertheless, the estimated coefficient on DRATE is significantly positive for both private and public BHCs, consistent with our earlier analyses. The estimated coefficients on the control variables are also consistent with those reported previously.
Because dividend payouts are naturally censored at zero, we also estimated annual tobit regressions to control for firm-quarter observations where the firm did not make a dividend distribution. Untabulated results of these tobit regressions are qualitatively similar to those reported in Table 4 , which suggests that including firm-quarter observations without dividend distributions does not bias our results.
The regression results presented in Tables 4 and 5 percent to 4.6 percent of our sample). Table 6 here -------------------------If a dividend tax rate reduction stimulates the non-paying private BHCs to initiate dividend distributions, this effect might be evidenced by a higher proportion of non-paying firms initiating dividend distributions after JGTRRA. 25 Table 6 also presents the number and 25 It is also possible that firms substituted dividend distributions for stock repurchases after JGTRRA. Because stock repurchases for closely-held companies are typically taxed as dividend distributions, we expect that any substitution between dividends and stock repurchases due to the dividend tax cut would be limited to public firms. The use of stock repurchases by private firms is likely to be driven by nontax considerations (e.g. buying out dissenting or retiring shareholders). Using a sample of firms with calendar year information for stock repurchases, we reestimated our random effects regression with stock repurchases (the amount of stock repurchases deflated by total assets) as the dependent measure. Consistent with our expectation, the regression results (untabulated) indicate that the level of stock repurchases declined for public firms after JGTRRA.
-------------------------Insert
proportion of non-paying BHCs that make a dividend payment in the calendar year following a calendar year without a dividend. While these numbers are small, there is a slight increase in the proportion of non-paying firms that initiate dividends after enactment of JGTRRA in 2003 (15.8 percent for private firms and 28.6 percent of public firms). Because of the high proportion of public BHCs that regularly pay dividends, it seems unlikely that the reduction in the dividend tax rate would have a discernable effect on the few public BHCs that do not pay dividends. Hence, we explore the potential effect of JGTRRA on the likelihood of dividend payments by BHCs by focusing our attention of private BHCs.
To formally test whether private firms are more likely to pay a dividend after JGTRRA, we estimate a self-selection model that integrates the decision to pay a dividend into dividend yield estimation. We are unaware of previous work to model the dividend payout decision for private firms; therefore, we view this analysis as exploratory. The self-selection model is specified as follows:
where:
PAY it = one if firm pays a dividend during the year, and zero otherwise, it TA DIV / = firm i's dividend yield in period t calculated by dividing total dividend distributions during period t by total assets at the end of period t, t DRATE = a binary variable that equals one if the top individual tax rate on dividend distributions is 15 percent in period t, and zero otherwise, Kit X = a vector of K explanatory variables used in equation (1) representing the annual financial characteristics of firm i during period t. indicating that more profitable firms are more likely to pay dividends. Growth is significantly negatively related to the likelihood of paying dividends suggesting that higher growth firms are less likely to make dividend distributions. None of the other control variables are significant. Table 7 here
The results from the dividend amount model are consistent with our previous results for private BHCs: dividend yield increased after the enactment of JGTRRA. Interestingly, only ROA is significant in the distribution amount equation once the self-selection issue is addressed.
Growth is not significant suggesting that although growth is an important factor in the decision to pay a dividend, once the decision is made to pay a dividend, growth does not influence the amount of the distribution. Similar to our results in Table 4 , LIQ, T1 Risk, and RE/TA are not statistically significant for private firms. The χ 2 tests of independent equations are not significant in any of the models indicating that the distribution choice and the distribution amount are not correlated for this sample. In essence, this means that we may estimate the dividend amount equation using OLS without concern of any selection bias.
26 Table 7 does not present the results from estimating the Quarter 2 fiscal year because the Heckman estimation procedure did not reach convergence.
VI. CONCLUSION
We analyze the dividend policy for private and public bank holding companies with the expectation that private firms are more likely to be influenced by individual tax considerations while public firms are more likely to consider nontax factors. We compare the level of dividend distributions before and after enactment of JGTRRA for both public and private BHCs to assess the extent to which differential taxation of dividend income versus capital gains for individual shareholders influences corporate dividend payouts.
So far as we are aware, this is the first study to compare the dividend policies of publiclytraded firms to those of privately-held firms. Relative to publicly-traded BHCs, privately-held
BHCs have more tax reasons to avoid dividends because their shareholders are more likely to be individuals and have fewer non-tax reasons to pay dividends (e.g. agency costs) because their shareholders are likely to be more directly involved in managing the firm. Therefore, comparing payouts of private versus public firms, in combination with the dividend tax cut that was a central part of JGTRRA, provides a very powerful test of the hypotheses that the tax disadvantages of dividends for individual shareholders discourage corporations from paying dividends while agency costs have the opposite effect. Our analysis of distributions by bank holding companies also fills a void in the financial literature, most of which features tests based exclusively on industrial firms.
We find that BHCs' distributions are seasonal across quarters and trending upward over time throughout our sample period. Unlike industrial firms, the vast majority of BHCs paid some dividends prior to JGTRRA regardless of ownership structure. Consequently, we do not find a significant increase in the percentage of BHCs paying dividends after JGTRRA. However, we do find that the amount of dividends paid by BHCs (as a percentage of assets) is sensitive to the differential tax rates on dividend income versus capital gains for individuals, particularly for privately-held BHCs. In the periods prior to JGTRRA, when the maximum tax rate on dividend income exceeded the maximum tax rate on capital gains for individuals, we find that privatelyheld BHCs have significantly lower dividend yields than the publicly-traded counterparts. This result suggests that private BHCs retain earnings consistent with tax incentives for individual shareholders and/or that public BHCs distribute earnings to mitigate potential agency problems.
In the quarters after enactment of the dividend tax cut, we find that both private and public BHCs increased dividend payouts, but private BHCs increased dividend yields to a significantly greater extent than publicly-traded BHCs. This result is consistent with the notion that reducing the tax disadvantage of dividends relative to capital gains enabled private firms to satisfy pent-up liquidity demands of their individual shareholders at minimal tax costs.
Much of the political rhetoric preceding JGTRRA focused on the intended benefits to shareholders of public firms (e.g. increasing the value of the stock market and mitigating corporate governance problems). Indeed, we find that dividend increases by public BHCs were both statistically and economically significant. However, despite the focus on these stated objectives on public firms, our analyses indicate that, at least for our sample of bank holding companies, JGTRRA bestows even greater benefits on the shareholders of privately-held corporations. Assets represent total reported assets at the end of the period; Income represents net income for the calendar year; ROA is the ratio of net income to total assets; LIQ is the ratio of liquid assets (cash and balances due plus securities plus federal funds sold plus trading account assets less pledged securities) to total liabilities; Tier 1 Capital is core capital; Tier 1 Ratio is the ratio of tier 1 capital to risk-weighted assets; RE/TA is the ratio of retained earnings to total assets; Growth is annual growth in assets from the prior year (excluding 1998); Dividends are total dividend distributions made during the calendar year; DIVTA is the ratio of total dividend distributions to total assets; DIV/INC is the ratio of total dividend distributions to net income (missing if negative net income); and DIV/T1C is the ratio of total dividend distributions to tier 1 capital. All ratios are expressed as a percentage in whole numbers. Notes: Regression equation (1) was estimated using a version of a random effects regression based on a generalized least squares estimator that produces a matrix-weighted average of the between regression and within regression estimators. Besides correcting for fixed effects across time periods (years) and between effects across firms, this algorithm also corrects significance levels for first-order autoregressive disturbances. All probabilities are two-tailed except for Drate, which is tested using one-tailed probabilities. The regression sample is estimated with a panel of 1,296 firm-years for 216 private BHCs and 1,938 firm-years for 323 public BHCs. The quarter 2 fiscal year regressions are estimated with observations accumulated over the four consecutive quarters ending with Q2 and the calendar regression is estimated with observations accumulated over the four consecutive quarters ending with Q4. The dependent variable, dividend yield (DIV/TA), is the percent (in whole numbers) calculated by dividing dividend distributions aggregated over the four quarters in each period by total assets at the end of the last quarter. Drate is a binary variable that equals one for any four-quarter period that includes all quarters commencing after the enactment of JGTRRA, and zero otherwise. For example, in quarter two regressions, Drate equals one for the four quarter period ending 2004 Q2. The notes to Table 1 provide a detailed description of the remaining regression variables. Notes: The regressions are estimated using a generalized least squares estimator that produces a matrix-weighted average of the between regression and within regression estimators and corrects significance levels for first-order autoregressive disturbances. Probability levels are based on White's (1980) robust variance estimates for two-tailed ttests except for Drate, which is tested using one-tailed probabilities. Drate is a binary variable that equals one in post enactment quarters (quarters commencing with 2003 Q3). The regression sample is estimated with a panel of 1,512 firm-years for the private BHCs and 2,261 firm-quarters for public BHCs. Each quarterly regression is estimated with observations for that calendar quarter only. Hence, the Quarter 1 regression is restricted to observations for calendar quarter one, the Quarter 2 regression is restricted to observations for calendar quarter two, and so forth. The remaining regression variables are described in the notes to Tables 1 and 4 . Notes: The dependent variable in the payment equation, Pay is a dichotomous variable equal to one if the firm pays a dividend in the period; and zero otherwise. The dependent variable in the dividend amount equation, Div/TA, is the percent (in whole numbers) calculated by dividing dividend distributions aggregated over the four quarters in each period divided by total assets at the end of the quarter. The notes to Tables 1 and 4 provide a detailed description of the remaining regression variables. Only calendar year Heckman equations are presented because Q2 fiscal year Heckman regressions did not converge.
